Revista Temas de Derecho Constitucional

321 La cuestión preliminar del TJUE sobre la revocatoria del brexit: fortaleciendo el derecho constitucional de la unión europea. Clearly, the object of the question as portrayed by the petitioners consisted in the exis- tence of the third option adding to the acceptance of the the Withdrawal Agreement or the automatic exit from the EU in application of Article 50(3) TEU by the deadline of 29 March 2019 (if extension is not agreed). The Advocate General’s Opinion issued on 4 December 2018 heralded the possibility for unilateral revocation of the intention to withdraw. Advocate General Campos San- chez-Bordona weighted this possibility by reference to public international law and EU law. 12 First, Advocate General examined the rationale behind the request underlying that as the UK Parliament is supposed to finally approve the withdrawal agreement, various MPs held that the revocability of the notice to withdraw would open the possi- bility for the UK to maintain its EUmembership. This, in turn, would reduce the possibil- ities for an unsatisfactory Brexit. 13 In examining whether a Member State which has notified the European Council of its intention to withdraw from the EU in accordance with Article 50 TEU may unilaterally revoke that notification and the conditions to do so, the Advocate General identified several points. 14 The rationale behind the request is if the UK Parliament has to give its final approval, either a withdrawal agreement is reached and in the absence of that agreement, vari- ous members of that Parliament consider that the possibility to revoke the notice of the intention to withdraw would open the possibility for the UK to remain in the EU in the event of an unsatisfactory Brexit. In the Advocate General’s view, the Scottish court’s reasoning suggests that the Court of Justice’s answer would spell out the precise op- tions open to MPs when casting their votes. The UK Government’s main contention was that the question referred for a preliminary ruling was inadmissible, as the question was hypothetical and merely theoretical char- acter. This argument is based upon the lack of specific indication that the UK Govern- ment or Parliament intend to revoke the notification of the intention to withdraw. Advocate General Manuel Campos Sanchez-Bordona analysed the arguments put for- ward to conclude that, in light of the Court’s case-law, govern whether a reference for a preliminary ruling should be declared inadmissible. The Advocate General determined that the dispute was genuine and not merely aca- demic, nor premature or superfluous. On the contrary, the Advocate General held that the question has obvious practical importance, being key to resolving the dispute. 15 In addition, Advocate General emphasised that the authority to interpret Article 50 TEU definitively and uniformly rest with the Court of Justice which should perform a con- postponement of the vote by the government.LSE Continental Breakfast 15: the ‘meaningful vote’, available at (accessed 11 January 2019). 12 Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona, delivered on 4 December 2018(1), Case C‑621/18. 13 Opinion, para 4. 14 Opinion, point 4, paras 142-148. 15 Advocate General Opinion, para 38.