Revista Temas de Derecho Constitucional

322 Revista Temas de Derecho Constitucional siderable interpretative task in order to determine whether or not that treaty provision consents the notification of the intention to withdraw to be unilaterally revoked. 16 In response to the question posed by the Scottish Court, the Advocate General proposed that the Court of Justice would, in its judgment, declare that under Article 50 the unilat- eral revocation of the notification of the intention to withdraw from the EU is allowed until such time as the withdrawal agreement is formally concluded. Delving into detail, Advocate General added that the revocation should be decided upon in accordance with the Member State’s constitutional requirements, formally notified to the European Council and not involve an abusive practice (such as using successive notifications and revocations in order to improve the terms of its withdrawal from the European Union). 17 The Advocate General interpreted Article 50 TEU, relying in what is not expressly provid- ed for in that article, to the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter VCLT). Pursuant to Article 68 of that Convention, according to the Advocate General the possibility to revoke the notification continues to exist until such time as the withdrawal agreement is formally concluded. In applying Article 68 of the VCLT, Advocate General enquired into the nature of the pro- vision making reference to the travaux preparatoires. A remarkable discussion about the customatory nature of Article 68 is put forward in the Opinion to then confirm the unilateral nature of the revocation. 18 Overall, the Advocate General harnessed the ar- guments in favour of the revocation of the intention to withdraw by mainly using an international law framework and regarding the withdrawal clause as lex specialis . 4. THE ECJ PRELIMINARY RULING The Court’s judgment agreed with the essence of the Advocate-General’s Opinion, con- firming the right of a Member State to revoke unilaterally a notification of intention to withdraw from the EU made under Article 50(2) TEU. However, the final judgment relies on different arguments to those put forward by the Advocate General to uphold the right to revoke rooted in the sovereign discretion of the withdrawing Member State. To address the various points raised in the preliminary ruling, the article first deals with the existence of a dispute and the content of the request as analysed by the Court to then scrutinize the substantive arguments given by the Court. There were points of dissent with the AG’s opinion as explained below. The main point of dissent concerned the period for the revocation of withdrawal. The ECJ determined that the possibility continues to exist the withdrawal agreement enters into force rather than when it is formally concluded. 16 Advocate General Opinion, para 132. 17 Advocate General Opinion, para 153. 18 See A. Tzanakopoulos, ‘Article 68 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’, in Oliver Corten, and Pierre Klein, eds., Oxford University Press, Vol. II, p. 1565. See also H. Krieger, , ‘Article 68’, in Dörr, Oliver, Schmalenbach, Kirsten, (eds.), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties —A Commentary, 2nd ed., Springer, Berlin, 2018, p. 1259, adopts a position more favourable to the customary nature of Article 68.