Revista Temas de Derecho Constitucional

333 La cuestión preliminar del TJUE sobre la revocatoria del brexit: fortaleciendo el derecho constitucional de la unión europea. Court appealed to the Treaties’ purpose of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe in interpreting the options. Against this backdrop, the absence of the possibility to revoke the notification would, at the end of the period laid down in Article 50(3) TEU, “force the withdrawal of a Mem- ber State which, having notified its intention to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with its constitutional requirements and following a democratic process, decides to revoke the notification of that intention through a democratic process”. 71 This would thus be inconsistent with the aims and values previously referred to. 5.4. The unilateral nature of the revocation The unilateral nature of the revocation was submitted by the petitioners and the inter- veners in the main proceedings, although acknowledging that Article 50 TEU does not contain any express rule on the revocation of a notification of the intention to withdraw from the European Union. This right may only be exercised in accordance with the con- stitutional requirements of the Member State concerned, using the analogy with the right of withdrawal itself, as laid down in Article 50(1) TEU. According the parties to the main proceedings, the withdrawal procedure therefore would continuefor as long as the Member State concerned intends to withdraw from the European Union, but comes to an end if, before the end of the period laid down in Article 50(3) TEU, that Member State changes its mind and decides not to withdraw from the European Union. 72 In contrast, the Council and the Commission disputed the unilateral nature of that right although agreeing that a Member State is entitled to re- voke the notification of its intention to withdraw before the Treaties have ceased to apply to that Member State. 73 The Council and the Commission argued against the unilateral right of the Member State concerned, as it could thus invoke its right of revocation shortly before the period laid down in Article 50(3) TEU elapses, thus notifying a new intention to withdraw im- mediately after that period expired. 74 This would circumvent the rules set out in Article 50(2) and (3) TEU and could potentially lead to triggering a new two-year negotiation period trumping the time limit set out in Article 50(3) TEU, enjoying de facto, a right to negotiate its withdrawal without any time limit, rendering the limitation ineffective. 75 In practical terms, according to those institutions, unilaterality would entail a modifi- cation in the terms of the negotiations, as a Member State take advantage of the right of revocation to improve its position. Particularly, if the terms of the withdrawal agree- ment do not meet the expectation of that Member State, it could threaten to withdraw its notification to convince the EU institutions to modify the terms of the agreement to suits its requests. 76 71 Judgment, para 67. 72 Judgment, para 37. 73 Judgment, para 38. 74 Judgment, para 39. 75 Judgment, para 40. 76 Judgment, para 41.